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The application of federated extreme gradient boosting to mobile crowdsensing apps brings several benefits, in particular high
performance on efficiency and classification. However, it also brings a new challenge for data and model privacy protection. Besides it
being vulnerable to Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) based user data reconstruction attack, there is not the existing architecture
that considers how to preserve model privacy. In this paper, we propose a secret sharing based federated learning architecture (FedXGB)
to achieve the privacy-preserving extreme gradient boosting for mobile crowdsensing. Specifically, we first build a secure classification
and regression tree (CART) of XGBoost using secret sharing. Then, we propose a secure prediction protocol to protect the model
privacy of XGBoost in mobile crowdsensing. We conduct a comprehensive theoretical analysis and extensive experiments to evaluate
the security, effectiveness, and efficiency of FedXGB. The results indicate that FedXGB is secure against the honest-but-curious
adversaries and attains less than 1% accuracy loss compared with the original XGBoost model.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Extreme gradient boosting (XGBoost) is an efficient, flexible and portable model that has a good performance in dealing
with classification and regression, and hence applied in many apps such as malware detection [23] and consumption
behaviour prediction [28]. Highly optimized multicore design, tactfully distributed implementation and enhanced ability
to handle sparse data contribute to the success of XGBoost [5]. As a machine learning algorithm, the performance
of XGBoost depends on the quality of dataset. Therefore, most companies and institutions will collect datasets with
good performance by themselves but this will in need of lots of manpower [9] and material resources. Hence, mobile
crowdsensing (MCS), collecting data from volunteer users willing to share data, was proposed. Recently, the privacy
protection in MCS needs to be solved urgently [26].
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Consider the existing mobile crowdsensing architecture, a central cloud server, owned by a service provider, collects
the distributed user data and builds a machine learning model. Such architecture suffers from two limitations: (1) the
service provider has the heavy computational cost on the central cloud server since it not only stores a large amount of
user data but also builds the machine learning model [25]; (2) the service provider may leak the privacy because user
private data are operated in the central cloud server in plaintext. Such data leakage may cause severe problems for not
only individuals but also organizations. Nearly 3 million encrypted customer credit card records are stolen due to the
data leakage of the famous company Adobe, and this caused Adobe to pay for up to $1 million.
To address the above two limitations, the federated learning (FL) architecture is proposed [14]. FL is a kind of machine
learning method that allows distributed users to not upload sensitive private data but calculated gradients [11].
Users
Central Cloud 
Server ① Reconstructing 
User Private Data
② User Dropout 
③ Stealing 
Trained Model 
Sub-Model
Gradient Aggregation
User Databases
Fig. 1. Unattended Problems for the Current Federated Learning Architecture
Although users are protected against private data leakage, the federated learning architecture for mobile crowdsensing
leads other security issues, shown in Fig. 1. The detailed instructions are as follows:
• User Data Reconstruction. Recent studies pointed out that the federated learning architectures are vulnerable
to user data reconstruction attack [27],[6].
A malicious central cloud server can retrieve user private data by exploiting gradient aggregation results uploaded
by users based on the generative adversarial networks (GAN).
• Model Privacy Leakage. Existing federated learning architectures built a model relying on publishing the
newly built model to all users for the next round of model training [29]. However, users are not always reliable.
The trained model can potentially be stolen by adversaries with very little expense (i.e., some computation power
and registration cost).
• User Dropout. Instability of users is not handled by the federated learning architecture [14] or its follow-up
apps on specific models [30] [22]. Previous architectures make an assumption that users’ connectivity to the
server remain steady. Once an user is dropped out, they have no choice but to abandon the current round of
training.
To resolve the above issues, we propose a secret sharing based federated learning architecture (FedXGB) to achieve
privacy-preserving training of XGBoost for mobile crowdsensing. FedXGB is composed of three kinds of entities, a
central cloud server, edge servers and users. Compared with the architecture shown in Fig. 1, edge servers are included to
reflect the emerging edge computing architecture and provide a layer of privacy protection at the architectural level[21].
FedXGB proceeds in two steps. First, it invokes a suite of secret sharing based protocols for the privacy-preserving
classification and regression tree (CART) building of XGBoost. These protocols protect user private data against the
reconstruction attack. Instead of directly publishing the newly built CART, FedXGB applies a secret sharing based
prediction protocol for user data updating. It encrypts the model from being stolen by users.
In summary, our main contributions can be summarised as follows:
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• Boosting Privacy. FedXGB utilizes the secret sharing technique to protect user private data and the updated
model during each round of federated XGBoost training. The gradients of user private data are secretly shared to
protect them against the user data reconstruction attacks. The model prediction are performed with secretly
shared parameters to address the model privacy leakage.
• Low Accuracy Loss.We evaluate FedXGB by applying two popular datasets. The results indicate that FedXGB
maintains the high performance of XGBoost with less than 1% of accuracy loss.
• Robust Architecture against User Dropout.We validate that FedXGB stays stable to execute each round of
training when the user dropout happens. The effectiveness and efficiency are barely affected by the dropout of
users.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly introduce some background knowledge. Section
3 describes an overview of FedXGB. Section 4 and Section 5 list the implementation details of FedXGB. Section 6
discusses the security of FedXGB. In Section 7, we perform a series of comprehensive experiments. Section 8 discusses
the related work. The last section concludes the paper.
2 PRELIMINARY
The background knowledge about XGBoost, secret sharing and two cryptographic functions are briefly introduced in
this section. For convenience, notations used in this paper are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Notations
Notation Description
l(·) an arbitrary loss function with second-order derivative
дi the first-order derivative of l(·) for the ith instance
hi the second-order derivative of l(·) for the ith instance
ζu the secret share distributed to the user u
Ru the set of random share of private mask key for user u
F a finite field F , e.g. Fp = Zp for some large prime p
fk the CART obtained from the k-th iteration of XGBoost
⟨·⟩u key for signature, encryption or secret mask generation
2.1 Extreme Gradient Boosting
XGBoost is one of the most outstanding ensemble learning methods due to its excellent performance in processing
classification, regression, and Kaggle tasks[15], which implements machine learning algorithms under the Gradient
Boosting framework by establishing numerous classification and regression trees (CART) models. The core of algorithm
is the optimization of the value of the objective function Lk as follows.
Lk =
n∑
i=1
l(yi , yˆk−1i + fk (xi )) + Ω(fk ), (1)
where k is the number of iterations, n is the total number of training samples, i is the index of each sample, and yi
is the label of the i-th sample. yˆk−1i represents the predicted label of the i-th sample at the (k − 1)-th iteration. Ω is a
regularization item. By expanding Ω and using the second-order Taylor approximation, the optimal weight ωj of leaf
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node j is calculated as follows.
ωj = −
T∑
j=1
(∑i ∈Ij дi )2∑
i ∈Ij hi + λ
, (2)
where Ij represents the set of training samples in the leaf node. λ is a constant value. T is the number of tree leaves.
According to the above equations, we can retrieve an optimal tree for the k-th iteration.
2.2 Secret Sharing
Since attackers can easily derive user private data by exploiting the uploaded gradients [6], the (t ,n) Secret Sharing (SS)
scheme [20] is adopted in our scheme. For the (t ,n) SS scheme, a secret s is split into n shares. s is recovered only if at
least t random shares are provided; otherwise, it cannot be obtained. The share generation algorithm is illustrated as
SS.share(s, t ,n) = {(u, ζu )|u ∈ U}, in which n represents the number of users involved in SS andU = {1, 2, , ...,n} is
a set including these users. ζu describes the share for each user u. To recover the secret, the Lagrange polynomials based
recovery algorithm SS.recon({(u, [ζ ]u )|u ∈ U ′}, t) is used. It requires thatU ′ ⊆ U has to contain at least t users.
We apply a secret sharing based comparison protocol (SecCmp) [8] to fulfill the secure comparison in FedXGB.
Without revealing the plaintext values to edge servers, SecCmp returns the comparison result to the user.
Secure Comparison Protocol (SecCmp). Given two sets of secret shares, SS.Share(s1, t ,n) = {(u, ζ 1u )|u ∈ U} and
SS.Share(s2, t ,n) = {(u, ζ 2u )|u ∈ U}, the random shares of the comparison result {(u, ζu )|u ∈ U} is generated. Having
at least t shares, i.e., n ≥ |U ′ | > t andU ′ ⊂ U, the result is recovered. If s1 > s2, SS.Recon({(u, ζu )|u ∈ U ′}, t) = 0;
otherwise, SS.Recon({(u, ζu )|u ∈ U ′}, t) = 1.
2.3 Cryptographic Definition
To securely transmit data, three cryptographic functions are utilized in FedXGB.
2.3.1 Key Agreement. Key agreement is used for key generation. Three algorithms are involved for key agreement,
namely key setup KEY.Set, key generation KEY.Gen, and key agreement KEY.Agr. Specifically, the key setup algorithm,
KEY.Set(ℓ), is for setting up a public parameterppub . ℓ is a security parameter that defines the field size of a secret sharing
scheme Fp . KEY.Set(ℓ) outputs a quaternionppub ← (G,p,д,H ).G is an additive cyclic group with a large prime orderp
and a generatorд. AndH is a common hash function that generates a fixed length output. Consider two arbitrary users,u
andv ,u first applies the key generation algorithm to generate a private-public key pair (⟨k⟩pr iu , ⟨k⟩pubu ) =KEY.Gen(ppub ).
Then, u can use the key agreement algorithm to create a shared key with v , ⟨k⟩u,v ←KEY.Agr(⟨k⟩pr iu , ⟨k⟩pubv ).
2.3.2 Identity Based Encryption & Signature. Identity based encryption and signature are utilized to encrypt sensitive
data and verify identity, respectively. Given a shared key ⟨ek⟩enc = ⟨ek⟩dec ←KEY.Agr, the identity based encryption
algorithm IDE.Enc outputs ciphertext c =IDE.Enc(⟨ek⟩enc , t). And the decryption function IDE.Dec recovers the
plaintext t by computing t =IDE.Dec(⟨ek⟩dec , c). Similarly, the signature algorithms, SIG.Sign and SIG.Verf, are
defined. Given the key pair for signature (⟨k⟩siд , ⟨k⟩ver ) ←KEY.Gen, SIG.Sign outputs a signature σ =SIG.Sign
(⟨k⟩siд , t). If SIG.Verf(⟨k⟩ver , t ,σ ) = 1, σ is proved to be valid; otherwise, σ is invalid.
3 OVERVIEW OF FEDXGB
In this section, we introduce how the secret sharing based federated learning architecture (FedXGB) is implemented.
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3.1 Entities of FedXGB
FedXGB consists of three types of entities: usersU, edge servers E, and a remote central cloud server S. The entities
of FedXGB are showed in Fig. 2. Details are presented as follows.
DLocal 
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Application User 1 1u ，
… DLocal  Database 
11,n
D
Application User
11,n
u
Edge Server 1e
D1Local 
Database 2 1D ，
Application User 2 1u ，
…
D1Local  
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22,n
D
Application User
22,n
u Edge Server 2e
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Application User 1u，
…
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Database ,nD 
Application User ,nu Edge Server e
…
Sub-Model
Random Shares
Central 
Cloud Server
Fig. 2. Entities of FedXGB
Users.U = {U1,U2, ...,Uθ }. For eachUi ∈ U,Ui = {ui,1,ui,2, ...,ui,ni } represents a set of users belonging to
the domain i . Users are data generators and volunteers to participate in the crowdsensing model training for FedXGB.
Edge Servers. E = {e1, e2, ..., eθ }, where ej ∈ E is an edge server. Edge servers are provided by various operators.
Each edge server provides the communication service for users that belong to the domain it controls.
Central Cloud Server. S is a central cloud computing server owned by a mobile crowdsensing service provider.
The trained model in FedXGB only belongs to S, and is not publicly accessible.
3.2 Security Model
In FedXGB, we use the curious-but-honest model as our standard security model. The definition of the adversary A in
our security model is formalized as follows:
Definition 1 [18]. In a communication protocol, a legitimate entity, A, does not deviate from the defined protocol, but
attempts to learn all possible information from the legitimately received messages.
Any u ∈ U, e ∈ E and S can be an A, with the following abilities: 1) A can corrupt or collude with less than t
legitimate users or edge servers and get the corresponding inputs; 2)A cannot extract the information from other good
parties (e.g., legitimate inputs, random seeds); 3)A has limited computing power to launch attacks (i.e., polynomial-time
attacks). FedXGB needs to achieve the following two goals.
• Data Privacy. e ∈ E and S are unable to learn the private data of u ∈ U, especially through the data recon-
struction.
• Model Privacy. u ∈ U and e ∈ E are unable to learn the key model parameters owned by S.
3.3 Workflow of FedXGB
Two protocols are involved in each round of FedXGB, secure CART model building (SecBoost) and secure CART model
prediction (SecPred), shown in Fig. 3. Working details of the protocols are given below.
SecBoost takes the following four steps:
(1) Setup. All entities (i.e., U, E, and S) setup essential parameters for CART model building, including preset
parameters of XGBoost and cryptographic keys.
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Fig. 3. Workflow of FedXGB
(2) User Selection. According to the predefined standards, each edge server selects the active users in its domain.
The selected users verify the identity with each other and exchange the public keys. Additionally, each selected
user creates a mask key pair for further secret sharing between the user and its corresponding edge server.
(3) Key Shares Collection. Depending on the number of selected users, each user generates random shares of
the private mask key and sends each share to the other selected users. The set of key shares is constructed by
collecting the random shares from other users, and used to recover the private mask key when the user drops
out.
(4) Boosting. To build a CART model securely, the selected users mask the locally calculated sub-aggregation of
gradients and upload the masked value to edge servers. Then, the edge servers sum the masked sub-aggregations
and send the results to the central cloud server. The central server adds the received values up for further CART
model building. FedXGB iteratively calculates the optimal split to extract an optimal CART model until the
termination condition is met (Loop L1 in Fig. 3).
SecPred is designed to extract prediction results of the newly obtained CART without model privacy disclosure. S
executes SecPred by taking the following steps: a) all splits of the CART model calculated by S and user private data
are secretly shared to E; b) E repeatedly invokes SecCmp to compute the comparison results; c) The comparison results
are sent toU for updating yˆk−1i , mentioned in Eq. 1.
After SecPred terminates, FedXGB completes one round of training and begins the next round of training (i.e.,
Loop L2 shown in Fig. 3). When L2 is completed, S gets a trained XGBoost model f (x) = ∑Kκ=1 fκ (x), where K is the
maximum training round.
The security goals of FedXGB are achieved as follows. For the first goal, the gradient sub-aggregation of users are
protected with the secret sharing technique in SecBoost to defend the reconstruction attack proposed in [6]. And
the tree structure of XGBoost is chosen against the other type of reconstruction attack proposed in [27]. The security
analysis for the goal is given in Section 6 and Section 7.4. The second goal is also achieved by the secret sharing
technique in SecPred, whose security analysis is discussed in Section 6.
4 SECURE CART BUILDING OF FEDXGB
In this section, we present the protocol SecBoost in details.
In All users in FedXGB are orderly labeled by a sequence of indexes (i.e., 1, 2, ...,n) to represent their identities. Each
user is deployed a small local dataset Du . The messagem sent from A to B is briefly described as A⇒ B :m.
4.1 Secure CART Model Building
Protocol SecBoost is for secure CART model building, shown in Protocol 1. Refer to the overview of SecBoost
illustrated in Fig. 4, we introduce the steps in details as below.
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Fig. 4. High-level Overview of SecBoost
Step 1 - Setup: U, E, and S setup public parameters for key generation and model training. Firstly, FedXGB is
given the input space field Fq , the secret sharing field Fp , the parameter for key generation ppub =KEY.Set(ℓ), and the
publicly known XGBoost parameters including λ, l(·) and maximum tree depth dmax . and the publicly known XGBoost
parameters including λ, γ , l(·) and maximum tree depth dmax . Then, a trusted third party T generates a signature key
pair (⟨k⟩siдu , ⟨k⟩veru ) for u ∈ U. The encryption key pair (⟨ek⟩pr iu , ⟨ek⟩pubu ) is generated by u ∈ U.
Step 2 - User Selection: To minimize the cost for data recovery of dropout users, ej ∈ E selects the more active
users to participate in the model training. The predefined selection standards include the keeping active time, the
connection stability, and the maximum of users. The selected users are expressed asU ′ ⊂ U. The number of users
control by ej is nj , and their secret sharing threshold is tj . Through KEY.Gen(ppub ), u ∈ U generates the mask key
pair (⟨sk⟩pr iu , ⟨sk⟩pubu ) for secret sharing. The message for public key exchange (⟨sk⟩pubu and ⟨ek⟩pubu ) is signed. The
legitimacy of selected users is confirmed by verifying their signatures.
Step 3 -Key SharesCollection: Users generate random shares of their privatemask keys by computing {(u, ζ sku,v )|v ∈
U ′j } ←SS.share(⟨sk⟩
pr i
u , t ,n), and send ζ sku,v to each of the other selected users v ∈ U ′j in the encrypted format. User
v decrypts cu,v to extract ζ sku,v and expands its key share set Rv = Rv ∪ {(u, ζ sku,v )}. Rv is used to recover the private
mask key when the user drops out, as discussed in Section 5.2. The encryption key ⟨ek⟩u,v betweenu andv is calculated
by KEY.Agr(⟨ek⟩pr iu , ⟨ek⟩pubv ).
Step 4 - Boosting: Assume that the feature set of the user data is Q = {α1,α2, ...,αq }. For boosting, S randomly
selects a sub-sample Q ′ ⊂ Q and invokes the secure split finding protocol (SecFind), introduced in Section 4.2, to find
the optimal split. To build a new CART model with an optimal structure, S successively operates the boosting process
until the current tree depth reaches dmax or other termination conditions [5] are met. Finally, SecBoost outputs a well
trained CART model fκ .
4.2 Secure Split Finding for SecBoost
The most important operation in XGBoost training is to optimize the tree structure by finding the optimal split for each
node of the CART. In FedXGB, we propose a novel secret sharing based split finding protocol SecFind, presented in
Protocol 2. Details of SecFind are as follows.
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Protocol 1 Secure Extreme Gradient Boosting Based Tree Building (SecBoost)
Input: A central server S, a edge server set E = {e1, ..., eθ }, a user setU = {U1, ...,Uθ } and a trusted third party T .
Output: A well-trained CART.
1: Step 1: S selects security parameter ppub ←KEY.Set(ℓ) and publishes the model parameters ppub , λ, γ , l(·), dmax .
2: T generates signature key pair (⟨k⟩siдu , ⟨k⟩veru ) for u ∈ U, and operates T ⇒ U : (⟨k⟩siдu , ⟨k⟩veru ).
3: u ∈ U ′j invokes (⟨ek⟩
pr i
u , ⟨ek⟩pubu ) ←KEY.Gen(ppub ).
4: Step 2: ej ∈ E selects a set of active usersU ′j , secret sharing threshold tj and operates ej ⇒U ′j : (U ′j , tj ).
5: u ∈ U ′j invokes (⟨sk⟩
pr i
u , ⟨sk⟩pubu ) ← KEY.Gen(ppub ).
6: u ⇒ ej ⇒ S: (u, ⟨sk⟩pubu , ⟨ek⟩pubu ,σu ←SIG.Sign(⟨k⟩siдu , ⟨sk⟩pubu | |⟨ek⟩pubu )).
7: E and S verify SIG.Verf(kveru , ⟨sk⟩pubu | |⟨ek⟩pubu ,σu ) = 1 and forward ej ⇒U ′j : (u, ⟨sk⟩
pub
u , ⟨ek⟩pubu ,σu ).
8: Other users inU ′j verify whether SIG.Verf (kveru , ⟨sk⟩
pub
u | |⟨ek⟩pubu ,σu ) = 1.
9: Step 3: u ∈ U ′j computes and collects the shares of mask key ⟨sk⟩
pr i
u by invoking Ru = {(u, ζ sku,v )|v ∈ U ′j } ←
SS.share(⟨sk⟩pr iu , t ,n).
10: u ⇒ ej ⇒ v : cu,v ←IDE.Enc(⟨ek⟩u,v ,u | |v | |ζ sku,v ).
11: v ∈ U ′j decrypts ζ sku,v ←IDE.Dec(⟨ek⟩u,v , cu,v ), and collects Rv = Rv ∪ {(u, ζ sku,v )}u ∈U′j .
12: Step 4: S randomly selects a feature sub-sample Q ′ from full feature set Q.
13: S invokes SecFind(Q ′,U ′, E) to determine the current optimal split.
14: Repeat Step 2 until reaching the termination condition.
First, each user u ∈ U ′j generates a random value ru for masking secret. Each random share ζ ru,v of ru is distributed
to a specific user v . The secret masking function (SecMask) is given as follows.
SecMask(s, ru , ⟨sk⟩u,v ) = s + ru +
∑
u>v
⟨sk⟩u,v −
∑
u<v
⟨sk⟩u,v , (3)
where s is a secret value, v ∈ U ′j , ⟨sk⟩u,v =KEY.Agr( ⟨sk⟩
pr i
u , ⟨sk⟩pubv ). From Eq. 3, it indicates that ej can directly get
s when ⟨sk⟩pr iu is recovered without giving ru . As discussed in Section 5.2, the recovery always occurs when u drops
out. Therefore, ru is an essential value for the security of SecFind. The correctness of Eq. 3 is given in [4].
Then, u uploads sub-aggregations of gradients for all its data,
∑
1≤k≤ |Du | дk and
∑
1≤k≤ |Du | hk , mentioned in Eq. 2.
Each sub-aggregation is masked based on the Eq. 3. ej sums all masked sub-aggregations and sends the result to S in
the encrypted format. In order to get the correct summing result, ej has to reconstruct ru and subtracts it from the
masked sub-aggregations, ζHu and ζGu . The encryption keys utilized here are ⟨ek⟩u,ej =KEY.Gen(⟨ek⟩pr iu , ⟨ek⟩pubej ) and
⟨ek⟩ej ,S =KEY.Gen(⟨ek⟩
pr i
ej , ⟨ek⟩
pub
S ) Having the summation values from each ej ∈ E, S adds them up to get the final
aggregation result, H and G, for all data.
Finally, for each given candidate feature αq , S enumerates all possible candidate splits and publishes them toU.
Similar to the above aggregation process for H and G, S iteratively collects the left-child gradient aggregation results
for each candidate split. The aggregation results are used to compute the score for each candidate split according to
Eq. 4. When the iteration is terminated, SecFind outputs the split with maximum score. Moreover, the weights of left
and right child nodes about the optimal split are also determined by Eq. 2.
score =
G2L
HL + λ
+
G2R
HR + λ
− G
2
H + λ
. (4)
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Protocol 2 Secure Split Finding (SecFind)
Input: All candidate features Q ′, the active user setU ′, the edge server set E.
Output: The optimal split for feature α ∈ Q ′ and its score.
1: for 1 ≤ j ≤ θ do
2: Each u ∈ U ′j generates a random value ru and its random shares {(u, ζ ru,v )|v ∈ U ′j } ←SS.share(ru , t ,n).
3: u ⇒ ej ⇒ v : cu,v ←IDE.Enc(⟨ek⟩u,v , u | |v | |ζ ru,v ).
4: Each v ∈ U ′j receives cu,v and decrypts ζ ru,v ←IDE.Dec(⟨ek⟩u,v ,u | |v | |ζ ru,v ).
5: end for
6: for 1 ≤ j ≤ θ do
7: u ∈ U ′j generates ⟨sk⟩u,v =KEY.Agr(⟨sk⟩
pr i
u , ⟨sk⟩pubv ) for each v ∈ U ′j .
8: u ∈ U ′j computes ζHu ←SecMask(
∑
1≤k≤ |Du | hk , ru , ⟨sk⟩u,v ) and ζGu ←SecMask(
∑
1≤k≤ |Du | дk , ru , ⟨sk⟩u,v ).
9: u ⇒ ej : cu,ej ←IDE.Enc(⟨ek⟩u,ej , ζHu | |ζGu | | {ζ rv,u }v ∈U′j ).
10: ej decrypts cu,ej and reconstructs ru =SS.Recon( {ζ ru,v }v ∈U′j , t).
11: ej ⇒ S : Hj ← IDE.Enc(⟨ek⟩ej ,S ,
∑
u ∈U′j (ζHu − ru )), G j ← IDE.Enc(⟨ek⟩ej ,S ,
∑
u ∈U′j (ζGu − ru )).
12: end for
13: S calculates H ← ∑θj=1IDE.Dec(⟨ek⟩ej ,S ,Hj ) and G ← ∑θj=1IDE.Dec(⟨ek⟩ej ,S ,G j ).
14: for 1 ≤ q ≤ δ do
15: S enumerates every possible candidate split Aq = {a1,a2, ...,am } for feature αq ∈ Q ′ and publishes them to
each user u ∈ U ′ through E. For each ar ∈ Aq , take the following steps.
16: u ∈ U ′j generates a new random value ru , and shares it like what it does in the first loop.
17: u ∈ U ′j computes ζH,Lu ←SecMask(
∑
xu,l <ar hl , ru , ⟨sk⟩u,v ) and ζG,Lu ←SecMask(
∑
xu,l <ar дl , ru , ⟨sk⟩u,v ).
18: u ⇒ ej : cu,ej ←IDE.Enc(⟨ek⟩u,ej , ζH,Lu | |ζG,Lu | |{ζ rv,u }v ∈U′j ).
19: ej decrypts cu,ej and reconstructs ru =SS.Recon( {ζ ru,v }v ∈U′j , t).
20: ej ⇒ S : HLj ← IDE.Enc(⟨ek⟩ej ,S ,
∑
u ∈U′j (ζ
H,L
u − ru )), GLj ← IDE.Enc(⟨ek⟩ej ,S ,
∑
u ∈U′j (ζ
G,L
u − ru )).
21: S: HL ← ∑θj=1IDE.Dec(⟨ek⟩ej ,S ,HLj ), HR = H − HL and GL ← ∑θj=1IDE.Dec(⟨ek⟩ej ,S ,GLj ), GR = G −GL .
22: S then obtains score ← max(score, G
2
L
HL+λ
+
G2R
HR+λ
− G2H+λ ).
23: end for
5 SECURE CART MODEL PREDICTION OF FEDXGB
In this section, the protocol SecPred is presented in details. Besides, we discuss its robustness against user dropout.
5.1 Secure CART Model Prediction
For existing federated learning schemes, an indispensable operation is to update each user’s local model at the end of
each round of training [14]. For XGBoost, the updated model is used for extracting prediction results to update the
yˆk−1i in Eq. 1 that are taken as input of the next round of training. However, users are honest-but-curious entities.
They potentially steal the model information to benefit themselves (e.g. sell the model to the competitors of S). To
protect the model privacy, FedXGB executes a lightweight secret sharing protocol SecPred, presented in Protocol 3,
instead of transmitting the updated CART model in plaintext. In SecPred, S takes a CART model as input andU takes
as input of the weights of leaf nodes in the CART model. S and U secretly and separately send the shared model
parameters (optimal split to each node) and user data (feature values to each optimal split) to edge servers. Then, E
executes SecCmp and returns each comparison result to the corresponding user. Finally,U decides the leaf node for
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each sample based on the comparison results and collects prediction results based on the weights of leaf nodes. Under
such way, we guarantee nodes of the CART model are unable to be accessed byU and E.
Protocol 3 Secure Prediction for a CART (SecPred)
Input: S gets a CART f and the thresholds for its nodes, {ϑ1,ϑ2, ...,ϑn };U gets leaf node weights of f .
Output: The prediction result.
1: for 1 ≤ i ≤ n do
2: S computes {(S, ζS,ej )|ej ∈ E} ←SS.Share(ϑi , tE , |E |) and sends them to the corresponding edge server.
3: for each u ∈ U do
4: Select the feature values Ωu = {ϱ1, ϱ2, ...} corresponding to ϑi .
5: Compute {(u, ζu,ej )|e ∈ E} ← SS.Share (ϱ ∈ Ωu , tE , |E |) and send to the corresponding edge server.
6: end for
7: E invokes SecCmp({(ej , ζS,ej )|ej ∈ E}, {(u, ζu,ej )| ej ∈ E}) and forwards corresponding results to u ∈ U.
8: end for
9: Based on the results, u ∈ U determines the leaf node and obtains the prediction result.
5.2 Robustness against User Dropout.
Three possible cases of user dropout in FedXGB are discussed as follows.
Case 1: A user u0 drops out at the Step 1 or Step 3 of Protocol 1. Thus, the edge server e0 ∈ E of u0 cannot receive
messages from u0 anymore. In such case, e0 reject the message u0 uploaded in the current round of training.
Case 2: A user u0 drops out during the split finding process. Its edge server e0 ∈ E recovers the private mask key of
u0 and removes u0 fromU ′0 if u0 does not reconnect in the subsequent computation, that is, the remaining user set
U ′′0 ⊆ U ′0 andu0 ∈ (U ′0 \ U ′′0 ). To recover the private mask key ofu0, the edge server e0 first collects the random shares
of private mask key from at least t0 users, i.e., ζ sku0,v ∈ Rv , v ∈ U ′′0 and |U ′′0 | > t0. Then, e0 extracts the private mask
key of u0 through ⟨sk⟩pr iu0 ←SS.Recon({(v, ζ sku0,v )}v ∈U′′ , t0). Finally, e0 retrieves the gradient aggregation result (line
11 and 20, Protocol 2) by adding the recomputed values, that is,
∑
u ∈U′j (ζu − ru )) +
∑
u0>v ⟨sk⟩u0,v −
∑
u0<v ⟨sk⟩u0,v .
Here, ⟨sk⟩u0,v =KEY.Agr(⟨sk⟩pr iu0 , ⟨sk⟩
pub
v ).
Case 3: A user u0 drops out at the prediction step. The edge server e0 ∈ E directly ignores the prediction request of
u0 and removes u0 from the active users at the next iteration.
6 SECURITY ANALYSIS
The FedXGB security depends on three protocols, SecFind and SecBoost and SecPred. To prove their security, we
give the formal definition of security for secret sharing protocol Definition 2 [12] and Theorem 1 from [8].
Definition 2.We say that a protocol π is secure if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator ξ that can generate
a view for the adversary A in the real world and the view is computationally indistinguishable from its real view.
Theorem 1. The protocol SecCmp is secure in the honest-but-curious security model. Since the security of SecPred is only
related to SecCmp, we omit its security proof which has been given in [8]. The security of SecFind and SecBoost is
proved as follows.
Theorem 2. The protocol SecFind is secure in the honest-but-curious security model.
Proof. Denote the views of user and edge server asVu = {viewu1 , ...,viewun } andVe = {viewe1 , ...,vieweθ }. From
the operation process of SecFind, we can derive viewej = {ζHu , ζGu ,Hj ,G j , ζH,Lu , ζG,Lu ,HLj ,GLj , ru , ⟨ek⟩u,S , ⟨ek⟩ej ,S},
viewu = {ζHu , ζGu , ζ sku,v , ζ ru,v , ru ,A, ζH,Lu , ζG,Lu , ⟨ek⟩u,S , ⟨ek⟩u,v , ⟨sk⟩u,v } andviewS = {H ,G,Hj ,G j ,A,HL ,HR ,HLj ,HRj ,GL ,
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GR ,G
L
j ,G
R
j , score, ⟨ek⟩ej ,S}, where u ∈ Uj , v ∈ Uj , ej ∈ E and u , v . Based on Theorem 1, it can be seen that, ex-
cept the XGBoost parameters, the elements belonging to viewu , viewej and viewS are all uniformly random shares.
According to Shamir’s secret sharing theory [13], the shares can be simulated by randomly chosen values from Fp .
Consequently, there exists a simulator ξ that can generate indistinguishable simulated view from the real view of
SecFind. According to Definition 1, it is derived that the protocol is secure.
Theorem 3. The protocol SecBoost is secure in the honest-but-curious security model.
Proof. In the protocol SecBoost, the user and edge server views denoted as Vu = {viewu1 , ...,viewun } and Ve =
{viewe1 , ...,vieweθ }. From the protocol definition, only parts of users are selected for model training in SecBoost. The
views of unselected users are set to be empty. The views of remaining usersU ′ ⊆ U areviewu = {⟨k⟩siдu , ⟨k⟩veru , ⟨sk⟩pr iu ,
⟨sk⟩pubu , ⟨ek⟩pr iu , ⟨ek⟩pubu ,σv , cv,u ,Ru , view ′u }. And for the edge server and the cloud server, their views are viewej =
{⟨k⟩veru , ⟨sk⟩pubej , ⟨ek⟩
pub
ej ,σu , cv,u , view
′
ej } and viewS = {⟨k⟩veru , ⟨sk⟩
pub
u , ⟨ek⟩pubu ,σu , cv,u , view ′S}, where u ∈ U ′j ,
v ∈ U ′j , ej ∈ E and u , v . view ′u , view ′ej and view ′S are the views generated by SecFind. Except the encryption keys,
ciphertext and signature which can be treated as random values, the remaining elements of viewu , viewej and viewS
are all random shares as mentioned in the security proof of Theorem 2. Thus, similarly, we can derive thatviewu ,viewej
and viewS are simulatable for the simulator ξ , and the simulated views cannot be distinguished within a polynomial
time by the adversary. Based on Definition 1, SecBoost is proved to be secure.
Lemma 1. A protocol is perfectly simulatable if all its sub-protocols are perfectly simulatable.
According to universal composibility theory given in Lemma 1 [3] and the above proofs, it is concluded that FedXGB
is simulatable. Based on the formal definition of security in Definition 2, FedXGB is secure.
7 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first introduce the experiment configuration. Then we analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of
FedXGB by conducting experiments.
7.1 Experiment Configuration
Environment. Aworkstation, with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7920HQ CPU@3.10GHz and 64.00GB of RAM, is utilized to
serve as our central server. Ten computers, with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-7400 CPU @3.00GHz and 8.00GB of RAM, are
set up. By launching multiple processes, each of them simulates at most two edge servers. We also deploy 30 standard
BeagleBone Black development boards to serve as crowdsensing users. Each of them simulates at most 30 users. The
programs are implemented in C++. OpenMP library [16] is used to accelerate the concurrent operations.
Dataset. Two datasets are collected, ADULT1 and MNIST2. ADULT is for adult income prediction, which has
123 features, and provides 32k instances for training data, 16k instances for testing. MNIST is for handwriting digit
classification, which has 784 features, and divides the instances into 60k for training and 10k for testing. Both are
commonly used databases to evaluate machine learning model performance.
Setup. Parameters in FedXGB are set up as, step size η = 0.3, minimum loss reduction γ = 0.1, regulation rate
λ = 1.0, user number n = 300, maximum tree depth dmax = 3, and edge server number θ = 10. We use Elliptic-Curve
Diffie-Hellman [7] over the NIST P-256 curve, composed with a SHA-256 hash, to fulfill key agreement,. Authenticated
encryption is operated by 128-bit AES-GCM [2]. Given each dataset, the instances are averagely assigned to each user
with no overlap. User dropout is assumed to occur every 10 rounds of boosting in our experiment. That is, 0%, 10%, 20%,
1ADULT: https://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/ cjlin/libsvmtools/datasets/binary.html
2MNIST: http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
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30% of users are randomly selected to be disconnected at each 10th round of training. Meanwhile, the same number of
replacements are rearranged to substitute the lost users.
7.2 Effectiveness Analysis
To assess the effectiveness of FedXGB, we compute its classification accuracy and loss under the two datasets. The loss
functions utilize in the experiments are the logistic regression for ADULT and the softmax for MNIST. We evaluate
the accuracy and loss for each boosting stage in FedXGB, shown in Fig. 5. Fig. 5(c) and Fig. 5(d) respectively show the
accuracy and loss of MNIST, and Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b) reveal the result of ADULT. When boosting stage is determined,
FedXGB has only a loss of less than 1% compared with the original XGBoost. FedXGB acquires small fault tolerance
with the user dropout rate ranged from 0% to 30%.
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(d) Loss with different user dropout rates for MNIST.
Fig. 5. Accuracy and loss for each boosting stage in FedXGB for ADULT and MNIST
7.3 Efficiency Analysis
7.3.1 Theoretical Analysis. To evaluate the efficiency of FedXGB, we first perform the theoretical analysis of computa-
tion cost for SecBoost, SecFind and SecPred.
Let |D| denote the number of training instances. The computation costs of each user, each edge server and the
central server for SecBoost are O(n/θ + (n/θ ) · δdmax |D|), O(n/θ + (n/θ )2 · δdmax |D|) and O(n + δθdmax ). As
shown in Protocol 1, SecBoost has four steps. Since the setup stage can be operated offline, its computation and
communications cost are ignored. The remaining three steps are divided into two parts. One part contains the second
and third steps. Each user executes 2(n/θ ) key agreements, signature and encryption operations, which take O(n/θ )
time. Each edge server executes n/θ signature operations, which also take O(n/θ ) time. The central server executes
n signature operations, which take O(n) time. The other part is composed of dmax invocations of SecFind. And for
12
Cloud-based Federated Boosting for Mobile Crowdsensing Woodstock ’18, June 03–05, 2018, Woodstock, NY
SecFind, the gradient aggregation is operated for δ times, which takes O((n/θ ) · δ |D|), O((n/θ )2 · δ |D|) and O(δθ )
time for each user, each edge server and the central server. As for the SecPred, it invokes SecCmp for dmax times, which
takes O(|D|), O(dmax |D|) and O(dmax ) time.
7.3.2 Experiment Results. To further evaluate the efficiency of FedXGB, we experiment with the runtime and commu-
nication overhead under different numbers of users and edge servers as shown in Fig. 6. In the experiments, we set
|D | = 50K and δ = 100.
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Fig. 6. Runtime and communication overhead with different numbers of users and edge servers.
Number of Users.When the involved users increase, the runtime for each user grows linearly, and inversely, the
communication overhead for each user decreases, shown in Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b), respectively. The linear growth of
the runtime is caused by the incremental cost of user selection and key shares collection steps. And due to the less
samples distributed to each user, the communication overhead for each user decreases. The user dropout rate barely
influences the runtime because the correlated active user only need to transmit one secret sharing for the private
mask key reconstruction. Considering the impact of the incremental user number performed on each edge server, the
runtime for each edge server follows the quadratic growth, described in Fig. 6(c). The private mask key recovery for
dropped users has the main effect on the increase of the runtime cost. Nonetheless, the communication overhead is
barely influenced because only a little overhead increment is caused for the key shares collection stage of SecBoost.
The higher user dropout causes obvious time increment to reconstruct lost data via the time-consuming Lagrange
polynomials. Specially, the central server deploys less computation tasks than edge server, but has more runtime as
illustrated in Fig.6(e). The phenomenon is due to the fact that the central server has to wait for collecting every edge
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server’s response to continue the subsequent computation. The communication overhead plots about central server
are omitted, because, for central server, its communication overhead is just the edge server number multiplied the
difference between the edge server overhead and the user overhead.
Number of Edge Servers. When the involved edge servers increase, the runtime cost for each user decreases,
illustrated in Fig. 6(f). Because the number of users in each domain managed by each edge server reduces, the
computational cost of secret sharing also becomes less for each user. Similarly, the runtime cost of each edge server
decreases, Fig. 6(g) while the computation of secret sharing assigned on each edge server reduces. As more edge servers
are involved for computation, the communication overhead of each server decreases, shown in Fig. 6(h). For each user,
the communication overhead does not have obvious change because the assigned instances are static. And the cost of
central server performs similar to Fig. 6(e) with 300 users. Due to the space limitation, we omit these two plots in this
paper.
Table 2. Protocol runtime for different Stages
Stage
RunTime (s)
Our FedXGB
SecureBoost [6]
U E S
User Selection 0.285 1.112 3.288
N.A.
Mask Collection 1.333 1.458 N.A.
Boosting 18.802 23.308 26.863
46.25
Prediction 5.182 5.987 6.961
Total 25.602 31.865 37.112 46.25
In Table 2, we list the runtime cost of different stages in FedXGB. It indicates that the main overhead in FedXGB
is caused by the boosting stage, namely, the optimal split finding algorithm, because numerous loop operations
are proceeded. We also compare the runtime between FedXGB and the only existing privacy-preserving XGBoost
architecture, SecureBoost, proposed in [6]. SecureBoost deploys the homomorphic encryption algorithm (HE) technology
to protect the sub-aggregation of gradients. Since HE is still a time-consuming technique for multi-party computation [1],
SecureBoost takes more time than FedXGB to handle the same size instances. And different from FedXGB, SecureBoost
is specially designed for the vertically split distributed data (i.e. the data are split in the feature dimension). The setting
limits its suitable application situation, because for most circumstances of mobile crowdsensing applications, each user
independently forms a dataset with all features, like the individual income condition (i.e. the data are horizontally split).
Additionally, the user dropout condition and the model privacy leakage problem are not considered in SecureBoost.
7.4 Defense Against User Data Reconstruction Attack
GAN based reconstruction attack [27] is one of the most common and effective attacks against federated learning.
Based on GAN, the attack reconstructs user data by solving an optimization problem. However, FedXGB is protected
against such GAN-based attack due to the tree structure we choose. In order to validate how well FedXGB is protected,
we conduct two experiments by launching the user data reconstruction (UDR) attack against the original federated
learning approach [14] and FedXGB. In the experiment, MNIST is used, shown in Fig. 7.
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The left column of Fig. 7 illustrates that the federated learning approach is attacked successfully. The attacker (i.e.,
the central server), S, first collects the gradient aggregations uploaded by the specific victim ∇Gv and other users
∇Gi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Based on ∇Gv and ∇Gi , the attacker derives the representatives Xi of the victim by solving the
optimization problem Op = argmin | |∇Gv − ∇Gдen | |2 + Ωдen , where Ωдen is a regularization item and ∇Gдen is the
gradient of Xi . Given Xi , GAN outputs almost identical images.
The right column of Fig. 7 presents the failed UDR attack launched on FedXGB. Suppose that ∇Gi is the gradient
aggregation obtained by an malicious edge server ej . Because the CART model partitions the input space into discrete
regions, ej is unable to solve the optimization problem Op. The optimizer can only advance towards random directions
and output images that look like random noises. The gray-level frequency histograms in the last row of Fig.7 further
illustrate that, for FedXGB, UDR can hardly fit the features of original images.
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Fig. 7. Security of FedXGB against user data reconstruction attack
8 RELATEDWORK
Most of the existing privacy-preserving works for machine learning are data driven and based on traditional crypto-
graphic algorithms. For example, Wang et al. [24] proposed a privacy-preserving data mining model learning scheme
for canonical correlation analysis in cross-media retrieval system garbled circuit. Ma et al. [12] proposed a lightweight
ensemble classification learning framework for the universal face recognition system by exploiting additive secret
sharing. Considering the wide applications of gradient boosting decision tree (GDBT) in data mining, Zhao et al. [30]
utilized the differential privacy technology to implement two novel privacy-preserving schemes for classification and
regression tasks. Towards the patient’s medical data privacy protection in e-Health system, Liu in [10] advocated a
homomorphic encryption based scheme to implement privacy-preserving reinforcement learning scheme for patient-
centric dynamic treatment regimes. Because of data security driven, the above four types of privacy-preserving schemes
still have to upload encrypted user data to central server and cause massive communication overheads.
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Therefore, the federated learning concept was proposed [14]. Up to now, there were only a few works that adapted
the architecture to propose practical schemes for applications [22]. And most existing federated learning schemes still
concentrated on the stochastic gradient descent (SGD) based models. For example, considering the limited bandwidth,
precious storage and imperative privacy problem in Internet of Things (IoT) environment, Wang et al. [25] provided
a SGD based federated machine learning architecture based on the edge nodes. For the privacy-preserving machine
learning model training in smart vehicles, Sumudu et al. [19] proposed a federated learning based novel joint transmit
power and resource allocation approach. And to avoid the adversary to analyze the hidden information about user
private data from the uploaded gradient values, cryptographic methods were then added to the original federated
learning scheme for protecting gradients. Keith et al. [4] designed a universal and practical model aggregation scheme
for mobile devices with secret sharing technology. In [17], Richard et al. utilized the homomorphic encryption to protect
the uploaded gradients and designed an entity resolution and federated learning framework.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a privacy-preserving federated learning architecture (FedXGB) for the training of extreme
gradient boosting model (XGBoost) in crowdsensing applications. For securely building classification and regression
forest of XGBoost, we designed a series of secure protocols based on the secret sharing technique. The protocols
guarantee that the privacy of user data, learning gradients and model parameters are simultaneously preserved during
the model training process of XGBoost. Moreover, we conducted numerous experiments to evaluate the effectiveness
and efficiency of FedXGB. Experiment results showed that FedXGB is able to support massive crowdsensing users
working together to efficiently train a high-performance XGBoost model without data privacy leakage.
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